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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITS ON
BALLOT MEASURE CONTRIBUTIONS

E. MUELLER*
R. PARRINELLO

JOHN
JAMES

*

I. INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . .or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, or to
petition their government ...."1 Against this commandment our
courts must judge legislative attempts to promote government's
legitimate purposes with laws whose direct as well as indirect
consequences abridge free speech and assembly. In the political
forum, more so than in any other context, the courts have been
suspicious of such legislation because political 'speech and
association constitute the foundation of our democratic
government. 2 In addition to communications traditionally accepted
*John E. Mueller,J.D., U.C.L.A. School of Law, 1969; Member California Bar; partner in the
law firm of Dobbs & Nielsen, San Francisco, California.
**James R. Parrinello, J.D. University of San Francisco School of Law, 1974; Member
California Bar; partner in the law firm of Dobbs & Nielsen, San Francisco, California.
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Marguerite Mary Leoni for her invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 24-25, 39 (1976) and cases cited therein. See also BeVier,
The FirstAmendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 20-23 (1971):
Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
In Garrisonv.Louisiana, the Court said the following: "[Sipeech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75
(1964). See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
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as speech, the courts have protected other forms of political speech
and association, including obscene T-shirt slogans, 3 litigation to
bring about social change, 4 marches and assemblies, 5 symbols, 6
and money spent in political campaigns. 7
The courts in the 1980s will continue to wrestle with
fundamental constitutional and legal issues concerning the manner
in which electoral campaigns are regulated at all governmental
levels. Many jurisdictions have enacted campaign reform
legislation, some of which was passed in hasty and perhaps
misdirected reaction to the 1972 election campaign abuses and the
ensuing national embarrassment over Watergate. With a few
notable exceptions, 8 the courts' attention during the mid-1970s was
focused on the validity of campaign finance legislation in
connection with elections for public office. During the latter part of
the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s, that focus has expanded to
include "issue" as well as candidate campaigns, commonly
referred to as ballot measures, direct legislation, popular
legislation, initiatives, and referenda 9 (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "ballot measures").
As with candidate campaigns, two principal means exist by
which the citizenry exercises first amendment rights through the
spending of money in ballot measure elections. The interested
citizen may pool his money or assets with others by making a
"contribution" to an organized campaign committee, or the
individual may conduct a separate campaign by making'
"expenditures," independent of other persons and campaign
committees for such things as informational pamphlets, television
advertising, and other communications.
Since the early 1970s, a growing number of state and local
governments have enacted legislation regulating the amount of.
3. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
4. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
5. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
6. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
8. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); C & C Plywood v.
Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1971); Hardie v.
Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1976); Citizens ForJobs & Energy v.
Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976).
9. The initiative is the power of the people to propose laws or constitutional amendments
independent of the legislature. An initiative is generally proposed by presenting to the designated
state official a petition which sets forth the text of the proposed law or amendment and is signed by
the required number of voters. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (5th ed. 1979); CAL. CONST. art. II, S
8(a-b).
The referendum is the power of the people to approve or reject statutes that would otherwise
become law. A referendum is also proposed by a petition presented to a designated state official and
signed by the requisite number of voters. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (5th ed. 1979); CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 9(a-b).

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITS

393

money that persons and entities may contribute to a ballot
measure campaign committee or may independently spend 10 in
such an election. While it is now clear that all expenditure limits are
unconstitutional,1 1 there is a recent and dramatic split in authority
as to whether contribution limits in a ballot measure campaign are
permissible. This divergence of opinion apparently stems from a
fundamental conflict over whether in a ballot measure election the
government constitutionally may act as a public guardian from
what it perceives to be "dominant" influences cloaked in the veil of
monetary wealth. Standing in opposition to this governmental
regulation is the unfettered interchange of ideas crucial to the
democratic process embodied in the voting public's right freely to
receive and disseminate information.
The California Supreme Court's August 1980 opinion in
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley 12 (CARC) recently
approved the paternalistic approach by holding that limitations on
the total amount of money a person may contribute to ballot
13
measure campaign committees are constitutionally permissible.
Ostensibly applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the CARC
majority opined that such limitations serve the compelling
governmental interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral
system through the initiative and referendum without unduly
infringing on protected first amendment speech and associational
rights.1 4 On February 23, 1981, the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction over the CARC appeal. (Docket No.
80-737).
Three weeks prior to the California court's decision, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Let's Help Florida v. McCrary 5
10. "Contributions" are generally defined to include all types of monetary donations, loans, or
expenditures directly or indirectly in aid of a candidate or ballot measure made in conjunction with a
candidate or a political committee. 2 U.S.C. 5 431 (8) (A) & (B) (Supp. 1981); CAL. Gov'T CODE S
82015 (West Supp. 1981); see Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 822
n. 1, 614 P. 2d 742, 743 n. 1, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84, 85 n. 1 (1980). "Independent expenditures"
include all other monetary disbursements made independently of a candidate or political committee.
2 U.S.C. 5 431 (17) (Supp. 1981); CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 82025, 82031 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981).
Regulations have been promulgated at the federal level to govern candidate elections. See, e.g.,
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301, 86 Stat. 11, as amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 201, 88 Stat. 1272;
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, S 101, 90 Stat. 475; and
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 1 101, 93 Stat. 1339.
Such regulations have not been necessary for ballot measure campaigns, however, because none exist
at the federal level.
11. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. See also Common Cause v. Harrison Schmitt,
512 F. Supp. 489, 493-96 (D.D.C. 1980).
12. 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 1344
(1981).
13. Id. The supreme court voted four to three to uphold the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Id. at 832,614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
14. Id. at 831-32, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
15. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), appealdocketed, No. 80-970, 49 U.S.L.W. 3467 (Dec. 8, 1980).
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(Let's Help Florida) held that similar Florida legislation limiting
contributions to a campaign committee in a ballot measure election
violated the first amendment. 16 The Fifth Circuit unanimously held
that the State had failed to show a sufficiently compelling interest
either in preventing corruption of its ballot measure process or in
promoting disclosure to justify the legislation's abridgment of first
amendment freedoms.1 7 Florida sought plenary review by the
Supreme Court, but at the time of this writing the Court had taken
no action. (Docket No. 80-970).
This article will examine the decisional ancestry of CARC and
Let's Help Florida.18 Examination of this case law will focus on the
constitutional issues that arise when contribution limitations are
imposed in ballot measure campaigns. 19 In this regard, special
emphasis will be placed on the strict scrutiny standard of review,
which is frequently employed by courts when monetary restrictions
are at issue in election campaigns. 20 This standard will then be
analyzed in terms of its employment by the California Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Finally, this article will discuss and evaluate the effect of
spending in ballot measure campaigns 21 as contrasted with other
influences on voter behavior and suggest the direction our courts
should take in resolving a significant issue yet unresolved in the
area of campaign reform: the constitutionality of limiting the
amount of money that can be contributed to campaign committees
supporting or opposing a ballot measure.
II. STATE INTERESTS IN CAMPAIGN REFORM
Campaign reform legislation purports to promote three state
16. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
17. Id. at 201. The court of appeals, like the California Supreme Court analyzed the legislation
under a strict scrutiny standard of review. Id. at 199.
18. See infra notes 20-71 and accompanying text.
19. The primary constitutional problem in this area concerns political speech. Political speech in
first amendment jargon is a term of art which is not limited to campaigning. It is generally defined as
speech that participates in the process of representative democracy. Be Vier, supra note 2, at 300. See
also Bork, supra note 2, at 26-29. Although the parameters of political speech are not definite,
campaigning lor a candidate or a ballot measure is clearly within any definition of political speech.
Content, however, is not the test of "political" in the first amendment studies. For example, speech
advocating forcible overthrow of the government would appear political to many observers.
Commentators argue, however, that such speech is not political and not protected by the first
amendment because it is not participatory in the system of representative democracy; it is designed
to destroy it. See Bork, supra note 2, at 29-30; BeVier, supra note 2, at 309-11. The need to fully
protect political speech, however, justifies the Court's extending first amendment protection to other
speech categories. Even advocacy of violent revolution is limited only by the clear and present danger
test. Be Vier, supra note 2, at 342-43, 358.
20. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 84 (1980).
21. See infra notes 128-70 and accompanying text.
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interests: first, to reduce candidate dependence on large
contributions;2 2 second, to decrease the risk of corruption; 23 and
third, to prevent the asserted distortion of public opinion caused by
the greater ability of wealthy advocates to spend during a campaign
to promote their viewpoints. 24 Typical legislative schemes initially
restricted the amount of money a person could contribute or
expend 25 in candidate and ballot measure election campaigns 26 and
required disclosure of the source, amount, and recipient of
contributions and expenditures. 27 Regardless of the legislative goals
behind these schemes, the United States Supreme Court in Buckley
29
v. Valeo28 (Buckley) and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
(Bellotti) has joined other courts in invalidating some or all portions
of such restrictive measures as being violative of first amendment
speech and association guarantees.
A.

CANDIDATE CAMPAIGNS

The watershed case delineating permissible spending
limitations in candidate campaigns is Buckley v. Valeo. 30 In Buckley
the Supreme Court scrutinized key provisions of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), as amended in 1974,31 and
section 6096 and subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.32 In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Act's
contribution limitations and disclosure and record keeping
provisions were constitutional. 33 It also approved the public
financing scheme embodied in the Internal Revenue Code. 34 On.
22. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
23. Id.
24. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 84 (1980).
25. See supra note 9.
26. See NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN. LEGIS. APPROACHES TO CAMPAIGN FIN., OPEN MTGS AND
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS, SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES REGULATING POLITICAL FIN. 3 (1974); AM.
LAW Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ANALYSIS OF FED. AND STATE CAMPAIGN FIN. LAW (Dec. 1976).
27. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE SS 84100-84217 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981).
28. 424 U.S. 1(1976).
29. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. See Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431)
(Supp. 1981). The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the 1974 amendments thereto
limited contributions to candidates for federal office by an individual or group to $1,000. An annual
overall ceiling of $25,000 per individual was imposed. Contributions by certain broad-based multicandidate political committees were limited to $5,000 per candidate per election.
Independent expenditures in support of a clearly identified candidate were limited to $1,000 per
individual or group. Candidates' expenditures from their personal wealth were limited depending on
the federal office sought.
The FECA also detailed a disclosure and record keeping scheme for political contributions and
expenditures and created an eight-member Federal Election Commission as the administering
agency. The Commission was endowed with executive, legislative, andjudicial functions.
32. I.R.C. S 6096; I.R.C. § 9001-13. The 1954 Code provided for financing from the United
States treasury for presidential primary campaigns, nominating elections, and general elections.
33. 424 U.S. at 23-38, 60-84.
34. Id. at 85-108.
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the other hand, the Court held that the Act's limitations on
independent expenditures violated first amendment free speech
35
guarantees.
The Court's reasoning was guided by several constitutional
principles. First, the Court recognized that a major purpose of the
first amendment is to foster free and vigorous political debate
concerning governmental and social policies. 3 6 Second, state action
trespassing in the area of fundamental first amendment rights is
subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. 3" The Buckley Court
reasoned that the spending of money in a political campaign, either
by way of contributions or independent expenditures, is political
speech because disseminating political information "in today's
mass society requires the expenditure of money. "38 The Court also
35.-Id. at 39-59. The Federal Election Commission, also created by the FECA, was held to
violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution in all but its investigative and informative
powers.
Corporate participation in federal candidate campaigns through contributions or independent
expenditures has long been prohibited by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and its successor, the
Federal Election Campaign Act. See 2 U.S.C. S 441b (Supp. 1981). Similar limitations have been
enacted by many states and local governments. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CoDE 5 16-20-08 (1977). The
Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this prohibition in the federal act although the issue has
been before the Court several times. See Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1973); United
States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
See also Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valo, Its Aftermath and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of
Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (1976). Clagett and
Bolton are outspoken in their criticism of the chilling effect of the Federal Election Commission's
broad discretionary powers and the in terrorum impact of its pronouncements. They are especially
critical of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act's crippling expenditure limits on independent political
committees, corporations, and trade unions. These authors believe that limitations on independent
political committees are patently inconsistent with Buckley, and that limitations on corporations and
trade unions should similarly be invalidated. See also O'Kelley, The ConstitutionalRights of Corporations
Revisited: Social and PoliticalExpression and the Corporationafter First NationalBank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.
REV. 1347 (1979); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148 (1974); Note, Corporate Contributions to BallotMeasure Campaigns, 6 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 81 (1973).
36. 424 U.S. at 14-15.
37. Id. at 29, 44-45.
38. Id. at 19. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld both the FECA's
contribution and independent expenditure ceilings as valid state regulation of conduct. Buckley v.
Valeo, 516 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Wright, Politicsand the Constitution, 85 YALE L.J.
1001 (1976). Wright states as follows:
No one disputes that the money regulated by the campaign reform legislation is closely
related to political expression. And no one disputes that the first amendment applies
with special force to the political arena. The legal question is thus not whether the
restrictions on giving and spending are subject to first amendment scrutiny at all. The
question is what degree of scrutiny should apply. There are basically two choices ....
The first is to treat campaign contributions and expenditures as equivalent to pure
speech. If this approach is proper, then the giving and spending restrictions enacted in
1974 should be treated in the same way as laws imposing a prior restraint on speech or
censoring particular points of view. Such laws are subject to the most rigorous scrutiny
known to constitutional law....
The second legal alternative is to treat political giving and spending as a form of
conduct related to speech-something roughly equivalent to the physical act of
picketing or to the use of a sound truck. Alert and careful judicial scrutiny is still
warranted ....
The regulation is constitutional if it serves an important governmental
interest and if that interest is unrelated to suppression of speech.
Id. at 1005-06. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that political spending was conduct, but
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reasoned that political spending, similar to partisan party activities
and political rallies, involves first amendment rights of
association. 39 Because the cost of an effective political campaign is
often great, it is only through resource pooling that advocates of
limited means can make themselves heard in political debate and
focus their otherwise individual efforts.4 0 The Supreme Court
concluded that since political spending is speech at the core of the
first amendment, any restriction thereon can be justified only if it
survives review under strict scrutiny.4 1 The state thus has the
burden to demonstrate a compelling interest that is advanced by
42
regulating speech and association.
In analyzing whether the state could show a compelling
interest for the legislation, the Buckley Court differentiated between
contributions and independent expenditures in candidate
campaigns. 4 3 Contributions to candidates were defined as a
"general expression of support" and an "undifferentiated
symbolic act." '4 4 Since the amount contributed is only a "rough
index of the intensity of the contributor's support," ' 45 such
limitations represent only a "marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage" in political communication. 46 The
Court noted that a contributor still retains the right to join those of
similar political persuasion and to campaign and spend
independently for the cause. 47 The Court, then applying the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, held that the government's
interest in avoiding the actuality or appearance of corrupting
48
elected officials justifies the contribution limits.
The Court held that independent expenditures were political
speech at the core of the first amendment and that the Act's
expenditure limitations substantially restrained the "quantity and
hypothesized that even if it were, the FECA's limitations would not survive the O'Brien testfor valid
regulation of conduct. The Court said the following:
Although the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to
its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect
electoral outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by
citizens and groups. . . . 1It is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the
alleged "conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some measure because the
communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful."
424 U.S. at 17 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968)).
39. 424 U.S. at 22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 19, 25, 44-45.
42. Id.
43. Id.at 21.
44. Id.
45. Id.at21.
46. Id.at 20.
47. Id. at 28.
48. Id.at 26-27.
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diversity of political speech." 4 9 It rejected the argument that any of
the state interests purportedly advanced by such limitations were so
compelling as to justify first amendment infringement. 50 The
Buckley Court reasoned that expenditures only remotely, if at all,
involve the risk of corruption perceived in contributions to
candidates because of the distance between the spender and the
candidate. 5 1 The suggestion that the government has a legitimate
interest in regulating candidates' and advocates' access to the
electorate by suppressing the speech of the more affluent was
rejected. 52 The Court held that equalizing the relative ability of
persons to influence the electorate was inimical rather than
promotive of the first amendment interest in maximizing robust
political debate. 53
B.

BALLOT MEASURE CAMPAIGNS

An important decision respecting spending limitations in
ballot measure campaigns predated Buckley by almost two years. In
Schwartz v. Romnes54 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that a New York law, 5 5 which prohibited corporate spending
for political purposes, was not applicable to corporate spending in a
non-partisan transportation bond issue campaign. 56 The court
reasoned that since corporations have free speech rights that can be
exercised only through the expenditure of money, 57 prohibiting
political contributions to ballot measure campaigns unjustifiably
inhibits free speech. 5 8 Noting that the "spectre of a political debt"
that will justify a total prohibition on corporate spending in a
candidate campaign vanishes in a ballot measure campaign, 5 9 the
Second Circuit refused to extend the law's regulatory net to
corporate "expression of opinion on fundamental issues of the
day.' '60
49. Id. at 19, 39.
50. Id. at 45.
51. Id at 45-47.
52. Id. at 47-51.
53. Id. at 48-49.
54. 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 460 (McKinney 1949) (repealed 1974) (political contributions by certain
organizations addressed in N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1978)).
56. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 852.
58. Id. at 852-53.
59. Id.
60. Id. In a California case the appellate court invalidated section 605 of the Berkeley Election
Reform Act of 1974, which prohibited corporate contributions to candidate or ballot measure
committees. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350
(1976). Relying on Buckley and CitizensforJobs& Energy v. FairPolitical PracticesComm'n, the California
court found that the only fact distinguishing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. from Buckley or CitizensforJobs &
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In 1978 the United States Supreme Court, in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, clarified how the Buckley discussion of
spending limitations in candidate campaigns applies to ballot
measure campaigns, at least insofar as corporate spending is
concerned. Challenged in Bellotti was a Massachusetts law that
prohibited specified corporations from making contributions or
independent expenditures in either a candidate or ballot measure
campaign unless the measure materially affected the corporation's
property or business interests. 61 The Court applied the exacting
scrutiny standard mandated by Buckley and invalidated the
restrictions in part because the asserted state interests were
insufficient to justify governmental encroachment on first
62
amendment expression.
The State contended that restricting corporate political
spending in a ballot measure campaign was justified in order to
promote confidence in government and to encourage citizens 'to
participate actively in the electoral process. 63 The State argued that
the spending prohibitions advanced these interests because money
promoting corporate views in ballot measure campaigns threatened
to drown out the voices of other advocates. 64 Although recognizing
that these were state interests "of the highest importance,' '65 the
Court rejected them as justifying abridgment of the first
amendment on two grounds. First, the State failed to make any
showing in the record that the citizen's role and confidence in
government was
imminently
threatened
by corporate
participation. 66 There was no showing that corporations have
played a dominant role in influencing ballot measure campaigns in
Massachusetts. 7 Second, the Court noted that the risk of
corruption simply is not present in a ballot measure campaign as it
is in a candidate campaign. 68 The Court also reiterated what it had
Energy was the corporate character of the plaintiff; the court failed to discuss whether the Buckley
contribution-expenditure dichotomy was significant in a ballot measure campaign. 60 Cal. App. 3d
at 126-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 351-52. See also 424 U.S. 1; Citizens forJobs & Energy v. Fair Political
Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976); infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
The California court reverted to the Schwartz analysis based on the nature of corporate speech
and held that the statute was unconstitutional because it abridged appellee's right to speak about an
issue that closely touched its property interests. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 353. See also
Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
bl. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, S 8 (West Supp. 1977).
62. 435 U.S. at 786-88.
63. 435 U.S. at 787. The State also contended that the spending prohibition protected
shareholders' first amendment rights that might otherwise be infringed should their political views
differ from management's as expressed through the corporation's political spending. Id.
64. Id. at 787-89.
65. Id. at 788-89.
66. Id. at 789.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 790.
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stressed in Bucky: the first amendment forbids the enhancement of
political expression for some at the sacrifice of reduced first
69
amendment rights for others.
While the supporters of the Massachusetts legislation urged
that corporate political spending may unduly influence the
electorate, the Court concluded that the risk that the voters may be
influenced to make an unwise decision is inherent in democracy; 70
courts cannot presume that the electorate is incapable of evaluating
the merits of political information, particularly when it is informed
1
of the source of the information. 7
III. THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
Buckley and Bellotti outline the constitutional principles for
testing the validity of campaign spending limitations and, in
particular, limitations on the amount an individual or group can
contribute to a ballot measure campaign committee. Since political
spending is protected as political speech and association, any
alleged encroachment on these fundamental rights mandates
review under the strict scrutiny standard. This standard first
requires the finding of a compelling state interest to justify the
restrictions.
Elrod v. Burns72 is perhaps the Supreme Court's most complete
synthesis of first amendment jurisprudence concerning the strict
scrutiny standard of review.7 3 In Elrod the Court held that
patronage practices, particularly dismissals on the basis of political
affiliation, were unjustified restrictions on non-civil service
employees' first amendment rights. 74 Postulating that the first
amendment is not absolute, Justice Brennan stated that restraints,
whether direct or indirect, were permitted "for appropriate
reasons," 75 but must survive the exacting scrutiny standard by
which encroachment can be justified only to advance a
69. Id. at 790-91.
70. Id. at 790.
71. Id. at 791-92. As for the state's interest in protecting shareholders' first amendment rights
that might be infringed by the corporation's political spending, the Court could find no substantial
correlation between the state's goal and restricting corporate political spending in ballot measure
campaigns since the corporation was still free to attempt to influence legislation through lobbying.
Furthermore, the Court held that the statute was overinclusive because it would prohibit corporate
spending to influence a ballot measure campaign even when unanimously authorized by the
shareholders. Id. at 793-95.
72. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
73. Although Elrod is a plurality opinion, even the dissenting justices agreed on the formulation
of the strict
scrutiny standard. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 381 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting;
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist,J., concurring in dissent).
74. Id.at 373.
75. Id. at 360.
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"'paramount" state interest "of vital importance.''76 The State
bears the burden to show that such a compelling interest exists and
that the legislative means chosen to achieve the state's interest are
precisely tailored to that end and represent the least drastic degree
If the means infringe
of first amendment impairment."
unnecessarily on first amendment values or are not substantially
related to achieving a legitimate state goal, the legislative scheme
will fail. 78
The initial step of the strict scrutiny analysis is to determine
whether there is a legitimate and important state interest, i. e., a
compelling state interest. 79 In Elrod one of the interests asserted to
support patronage dismissals was the preservation of party
politics.80 The Court rejected this as a legitimate state interest,
pointing out that preservation of party politics was an interest not
of the government but of the traditional party organizations.8 1 In
both Buckley and Bellotti the Court analyzed the legislation under the
strict scrutiny standard and required the government to show a
compelling interest for the legislation. The Court recognized only
the risk of avoiding corruption or the appearance of corruption of a
82
candidate for public office as a compelling state interest.
Establishing the state's legitimate interest, however, is not a
"talismanic incantation" that, like magic, will support the state's
curtailment of the first amendment. 83 The State must also show
that the exercise of free speech actually and imminently threatens
that state interest. 84 This is the second step in the strict scrutiny
analysis. The nature of the threat that will justify an infringement
on free speech sometimes has been described by the Court as a
"clear and present danger. " 85 Although the "clear and present
danger" test is not explicitly mentioned in Buckley and Bellotti, it is
the logical basis of the second step of the strict scrutiny analysis
applied in those cases. The "clear and present danger" test for
permissible first amendment encroachment was defined by Justice
76. Id. at 362.
77. Id. at 362-63.
78. Id.
79. Democratic Party of the United States of America v. La Follette, 101 S. Ct. 264 (1980);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1974). The state has limited powers, and its legitimate
sphere of interest is constitutionally defined. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 12-20 n. 13 (1972).

80. 427 U.S. at 368, 369 n. 22.
81.Id. at 368-70 & n. 22.
82. Common Cause v. Harrison Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 494-95 (D.D.C. 1980).
83. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
85. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Justice Holmes stated that "[tlihe most
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic." Id. at 52.
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Holmes in Schenck v. United States86 and reformulated in Brandenburg
v. Ohio.8 7 The test as stated in Brandenburgis as follows:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
88
action.
The Buckley Court implicitly recognized the applicability of the
Brandenburgcriteria to the strict scrutiny analysis when it concluded
that it is the risk of actual or apparent corruption inherent in
candidate contributions that justifies candidate contribution
limitations. 89 In Bellotti the Court again implicitly recognized the
relevance of the Brandenburg test. Rejecting the argument that
corporate spending would unduly influence the. electorate and
destroy confidence in government, Justice Powell wrote, "If
appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine
democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving First
Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration." 90 Justice Powell concluded his opinion quoting
Thomas v. Collins:91 '"[a] restriction so destructive of the right of
public discussion. . . without greater or more imminent danger to
the public interest than existed in this case, is incompatible with the
freedoms secured by the First Amendment. "'92 Thus, it appears
well established that in order to justify a curtailment of free speech,
86. Id.; Kalven, Ernst Freund& the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 236(1973).
87. 395 U.S. 44 (1969). Brandenburgwas a per curiam opinion from a unanimous Court.
88. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). But cf. Id. at 454-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
stated the following:
My own view is quite different. I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment
for any "clear and present danger" test, whether strict and tight as some would make
it, or free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis rephrased it. . . . [Sjpeech is, I think,
immune from prosecution. Certainly there is no constitutional line between advocacy
of abstract ideas as in Yates and advocacy of political action as in Scales. The quality of
advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction; and government has no power to invade
that sanctuary of belief and conscience.
Id. at 454, 457. See also Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" re-examined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1183, 1185-86(1970)).
89. 424 U.S. at 26-29.
90. 435 U.S. at 789 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 792. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) was decided on the basis of the "clear and
present danger" test.
92. 435 U.S. at 792 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).
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the Government must demonstrate an immediate threat of harm to
a legitimate state interest.
A.

APPLYING THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD

Once the State establishes that the speech presents an
imminent threat or clear and present danger to compelling
government interests, it must also show a sufficient nexus between
the speech sought to be restrained and the protection of the

compelling interests asserted. 93 In Greer v. Spock 94 Justice Brennan

noted that in all cases in which the State has successfully asserted a
compelling interest over free speech "the inquiry has been whether
the exercise of First Amendment rights necessarily must be
circumscribed in order to secure those interests. ' 95 The inquiry
turns on whether the suppression of speech .or association rights
abates the threat to the state interest, i.e., whether a precise
relationship exists between the legislation and the interests sought
93. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus the Court held that the state's strong interest in
regulating the legal profession and in preventing undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation,
invasion of privacy, and conflict of interest by attorneys was not threatened by mailed soliciation by a
nonprofit organization using litigation as a means of political education and action. Id. at 434-36.
The Court stated:
[Clonsiderations of effective judicial administration require us to review the evidence
in the present record to determine whether it could constitutionally support a
judgment [against appellanti. This Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of
constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make
certain that those principles [can be] constitutionally applied.
Id. at 434 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964)).
Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-68 (1978) (solicitation of paying clients
did threaten state's interest but no need to show that solicitation in the case before the Court actually
resulted in anticipated harm). See also United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 581
(1971) (record devoid of any evidence or allegation of conduct on the part of appellant or its members
that would support the state's restrictive interpretation and application of a law making it a
misdemeanor to solicit damage suits against railroads).
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court stated the following:
We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right ....
fOInly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation .... " No
such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case. The appellees suggest no
more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants
feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the
unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of
necessary Saturday work. But that possibility is not apposite here because no such
objection appears to have been made before the South Carolina Supreme Court....
Nor, if the contention had been made below, would the record appear to sustain it;
there is no proof to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which
respondents now advance.
Id. at 406-07 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)) (citations ommited). See Ihomas,
323 U.S. at 536. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107-08 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
94. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
95. 424 U.S. at 852-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967).
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to be protected. Further, the Court must determine whether other
means are available to protect the interest with less infringement on
first amendment rights.
In United States Civil Service Commission v. NationalAssociation of
9 6 the Supreme Court upheld broad federal prohibitions
Letter Carrier
against partisan political activities by certain federal civil servants.
In that case the Government was successful in both aspects of the
state interest analysis. The Government established an important
interest in preserving a nonpartisan civil service, thereby
promoting confidence in its impartial functioning,9 7 and produced
extensive evidence that partisan activities by civil servants
imminently threatended that interest. 98 On the contrary, in
Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission99
the Supreme Court held that state action curtailing the speech of
non-union teachers was unconstitutional when the record was
inadequate to show any clear and present danger to what has been
recognized in other contexts to be a substantial state
interests-protecting union labor and management relations. 100
B.

APPLYING STRICT SCRUTINY TO BALLOT MEASURE CAMPAIGN
SPENDING

The central question addressed by this article is whether the
state constitutionally can limit the amount of money a person or
group can contribute in ballot measure campaigns. Since it has
been clearly established that such political spending is political
speech and association,1 0 1 which are afforded ultimate protection
under our legal system, the resolution of this question lies in the
proper application of the strict scrutiny standard.
In 1976 the California Supreme Court addressed a related
issue, the validity of expenditure limitations in ballot measure
campaigns, and firmly adhered to the classical first amendment
jurisprudence enunciated in Buckley and later in.Bellotti. In Citizens
for Jobs and Energy v. Fair Political Practices Commission (Citizens) the
California court held that certain laws10 2 limiting expenditures to
influence the electorate for or against a state-wide ballot proposition
96. 413 U.S. 548(1973).
97. Id. at 557, 564-65.
98. Id. at 566-67.
99. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
100. Id. at 173-74. Compare Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
101. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
102. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85300-85305 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).
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were constitutionally invalid. 10 3 The court reasoned that Buckley's
invalidation of independent expenditure limitations in a candidate
campaign was dispositive, despite the fact that Buckley dealt with
spending limits in a candidate campaign rather than a ballot
proposition. 10 4 The court applied the strict scrutiny standard
employed in Buckley and held that the ballot measure expenditure
restrictions were not justified by any state interest in avoiding the
risk of corruption, equalizing the relative financial voice of
105
advocates, or curbing campaign costs.
In Hardie v. Eu'0 6 the California Supreme Court addressed
another spending restriction in ballot measure campaigns, the
legality of California's Government Code imposed limits on the
amount spent for circulating or qualifying petitions for the statewide ballot. 107 The court first noted that the circulation process was
a principal means of political advocacy for a proposed initiative and
that limiting the amount that could be spent in that process severely
curtailed political speech.10 8 The State contended that the
legislation was justified by the state's interests in preventing
corruption and in assuring that positions on the ballot not be
bought. 10 9 Subjecting the legislation to strict scrutiny, the court
relied on Buckley and similarly held that the state's interest in
preventing corruption did not warrant direct infringement on
political speech through these expenditure limitations. 110 The
court, citing Buckley and Citizens,"' also held that preventing "the
purchase of ballot positions" by moneyed interests did not justify
the limits.
In Citizens and Hardie the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that the strict scrutiny analysis, as expressed in
Buckley, was applicable to expenditure limitations in ballot measure
campaigns.11 2 Before analyzing the California court's application
of that test to the ballot measure contribution limitations in CARC,
however, it is necessary to clarify the fundamental differences
103. Citizens forJobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 675, 547
P.2d 1386, 1388, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1976).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1976).
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 85200-85202 (West 1976) (repealed 1977).
108. Hardie v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 376-77, 556 P.2d 301, 303, 134 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203-04
(1976).
109. 18 Cal. 3d at 377, 556 P.2d at 303, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 378, 556 P.2d at 304, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 204. The court did acknowledge, however,
that contribution limitations "remain a constitutionally valid means of dealing with undue influence
by moneyed interests in the electoral process." Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38
(1976)).
112. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
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between candidate and issue-related
constitutional analysis pertinent to each.

elections

and

the

IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN BALLOT MEASURE
CAMPAIGNS AND CANDIDATE CAMPAIGNS
The Supreme Court has recognized the difference between
ballot measure and candidate campaigns. In Bellotti it implicitly
recognized this dissimilarity by not distinguishing between
corporate contributions and independent expenditures in ballot
measure campaigns. Although this distinction would have been at
the Court's fingertips after Buckley, the Court held instead that the
challenged Massachusetts law, which prohibited both, was
unconstitutional in toto.
The primary governmental interest asserted by the State in
both Buckley and Bellotti concerned the avoidance of actual
corruption and the appearance of corruption. 113 Although the
Court in Buckley recognized the danger that arises when a political
debt is created in a candidate campaign,1 14 when presented with the
identical argument in Bellotti, the Court reached a contrary
conclusion. The Bellotti Court reasoned that the state interests
which support contribution limitations in a candidate campaign are
not determinative in a ballot measure campaign.1 1 5 The Court
relied on Schwartz v. Romnes 1 6 and its progeny 1 ' in stating that
"[t]he risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
issue. '118
In Schwartz the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
rejected the argument that a statutory prohibition on corporate
political expenditures was necessary to minimize corruption.1 1 9
The court reasoned that, "[t]he spectre of a political debt created
by a contribution to a referendum campaign is too distant to
warrant this further encroachment on First Amendment rights.' '120
113. 424 U.S. at 25. The State in Buckley also argued that the spending limitations equalize
access to the political arena and serve to curb the expense of campaigns. Id. See also Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 787-88. The State also urged that the legislation was necessary to ensure the active participation
by the citizenry in the electoral process in order to sustain public confidence in government. Id. at
788-89. Finally, the assertion was made that the spending limitations protect shareholders whose
political views differ from those of management. Id. at 787.
114. 424 U.S. at 27.
115. 435 U.S. at 790.
116. 495 F.2d 844 (2nd Cir. 1974).
117. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mont. 1976), aff'd, 583 F.2d 421
(9th Cir. 1978); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Berkeley, 60 Cal. App. 3d 123, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1976);
Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227, 396 Mich. 465, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976).
118. 435 U.S. at 790.
119. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 852-53 (2nd Cir. 1974).
120. Id.
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Thus, the state interest analysis results in a different conclusion
when applied to a statute regulating ballot measure campaigns as
opposed to candidate campaigns. The corruptive influence
argument apparently does not justify restrictions on contributions
in a ballot measure campaign.
The difference between candidate and ballot measure
contributions was also recognized by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson.12 1 That court
rejected the State's argument that a statute forbidding corporate or
bank contributions to ballot measure campaigns 12 2 was
constitutional under Buckley as a "contribution limitation." The
court stated as follows:
[T]he Commissioner's reliance on Buckley is misplaced....
As noted in Bellotti, Buckley was concerned with the
regulation of contributions and expenditures in partisan
election campaigns. . . . In contrast, the statute here, as
in Bellotti, applies to nonpartisan campaigns regarding
ballot issues. Although the relevant statute in Bellotti
forbade both contributions and expenditures by
corporations, the Court did not distinguish between the
two activities in deciding that the statute was
unconstitutional. 123
The distinction between contribution-speech and expenditurespeech in candidate campaigns cannot be meaningfully applied to
contributions to ballot measure campaign committees. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in Common Cause
v. Harrison Schmitt1 24 described in dicta the character of
contributions to campaign committees-albeit candidate support
committees that were independent from the control of a candidate.
The court stated the following:
The defendant political committees are simply pooling
agents for many small voices wishing to make intelligible
political statements .... Political committees pool money
from individuals who are interested in politics and
121. 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978).
122. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 23-4744 (1975).
123. C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
124. 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980). In Common Cause the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that section 9012(f) of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, limiting
independent expenditures in a presidential campaign by a political committee, was unconstitutional
as an abridgment offree speech. Id. at 500. See 26 U.S.C. $S 9001-9012 (1976).
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amplify their shared viewpoint into an efficient political
message....
The communication sponsored by the political
committees is the language of their members and
contributors.... 125
The relationship of ballot measure contributions to the
committee's speech is likewise direct, unlike candidate
contributions in which the resulting speech is controlled by
someone other than the contributor. The ballot measure committee
exists only to organize and effectively communicate the message of
its adherents for or against the proposed measure. The Supreme
Court's characterization of candidate contributions as a "general
expression of support" 126 for the candidate is not applicable in
ballot measure elections. Hence, limitations in such elections
should not be characterized as representing only a "marginal
encroachment" on speech and association rights. The authors also
postulate that contributions to ballot measure campaigns are
similar to independent expenditures which Buckley held to be direct
speech by the spender. 127 Thus, any analysis of limitations on ballot
measure contributions seemingly should proceed from the theory
that such limitations are substantial rather than marginal first
amendment restrictions.
V. CITIZENS AGAINST RENT CONTROL V. CITY OF
BERKELEY
In CARC sections of the Berkeley Election Reform Act of
125. 512 F. Supp. at 496-97.
A word is in order to point out how speech promulgated through a political
committee bears a different relation to its constituent contributors than does a
candidate's speech to his or her constituent supporters (or, contributors to the
nonpublicly funded candidate). A candidate strives to satisfy and mollify his or her
supporters whenever possible; the politician, after all, depends considerably on
pleasing supporters in order to maintain the campaign's momentum and coherence.
Candidates are loosely tethered, not bound, to the notions of political speech held by
their supporters. Political committees, on the other hand, are bound to reify the
political thoughts of their member-contributors. The political communication by
political committees is circumscribed by the expectations and understandings of the
associates. The organizers of independent political committees, as agents and unlike
candidates, are tied by their commitments to their particular contributors. The
candidate, however, is free to exercise his or her own judgment as to what is in his or
her own best interests based on a broader constituency.
Id. at 497-98. See also Note, The Unconstitutionalityof Limitations on Contributionsto PoliticalCommittees in
the1975 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953, 959 (1977). A contribution to a
political committee, unlike a contribution to a candidate "involves the donor's own speech. The
donor does not give money in order that someone else speak; he constitutes a part of that which is
speaking." Id.
126. 424 U.S. at21.
127. 424 U.S. at 16, 19. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Limitations on Contributions to Political
Committees in the 1976 FederalElection CampaignAct Amendments, 86 YALE LJ.953, 957-61 (1977).
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1974 were in issue. 128 Section 602 provides as follows: "No person
shall make, and no campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any
contribution which will cause the total amount contributed by such
person with respect to a single election in support of or in
opposition to a measure to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars
($250). '"129 Reversing two lower courts, the California Supreme
Court held by a narrow majority that this section of the Act was
constitutional because it served the compelling governmental
interest of preserving the integrity of the initiative and referendum
processes from perversion by large contributions1 30 with only
1 31
minimal infringement on first amendment rights.
The court initiated its discussion of the interests asserted by
the state by noting the significant democratic function served by the
initiative and referendum,1 32 which allow the electorate the
opportunity to participate directly in the political process. 133 The
court concluded that this function is perverted when large
contributions are injected into the electoral process. 34 Asserting
that large contributions detrimentally affect both ballot measure
and candidate campaigns, the court delineated the impact of this
phenomenon. It reasoned that instead of fostering participation by
the electorate, large contributions engender participation only by
special interests. 1 35 The ultimate effect is voter apathy and loss of
voter confidence in the electoral process. 36 The court concluded
that these interests were protected bythe legislation and should be
recognized as compelling. '7
Opponents of the legislation contended that the ordinance
abridged first amendment speech by stifling the amount of
information disseminated to the public. The court concluded that
128. BERKELEY, CAL., BERKELEY ELECTION REFORM ACT SS 602, 604 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.)
(1974).
129. Section 219 of the Berkeley Election Reform Act defines "persons" as "an individual,
proprietorship, firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business trust, company, corporation,
association, committee, and any other organization or group of persons acting in concert." Id.at

S219.
130. 27 Cal. 3d at 830,614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
131. Id. at 831-32, 614 P.2d at 748-49, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
132. Id. at 824, 614 P.2d at 745, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 87. The court described initiative and
referendum as "one of the most precious rights of our democratic process." Id. (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 825, 614 P.2d at 745-46, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88.
134. Id. The court reached this conclusion even though acknowledging that ballot measure
elections do not create the same problems as candidate elections. The court noted that candidate
elections raise the risk of creating future political debts. Id. (citing Bellotti).
135. Id. The court explained that "[w]hen large contributors use the power of their purse to
overcome the power of reason, they thwart the intended purpose of the initiative and referendum:
instead of fostering participation by a greater segment of the electorate, the vision of direct
democracy is transformed into a tool of narrow interests." Id. at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal, Rptr.
at 88.
136. Id. at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
137. Id. at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.

410

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

the infringement was only minimal since the legislation here, unlike
that in Bellotti, only limited contributions; it did. not prohibit
them. 13 8 As a result, the ordinance only marginally restricted
3 9 The court further justified the infringement
political expression. 1
by noting that independent expenditures by the contributor remain
unlimited aiod that an individual is still free to volunteer services to
a ballot measure campaign. 140 The argument that the contribution
limit encroached on association rights was rejected, with the court
observing that the contributor still remains free to join any political
association. 141
Although the legislation in CARC was purportedly examined
under strict judicial scrutiny, the court actually appeared to balance
the city's asserted interest in protecting the initiative and
referendum process against the contributor's first amendment
rights. Finding that the restriction only "marginally" encroached
on first amendment rights, the court never inquired whether the
record demonstrated that contributions in excess of $250 perverted
the electoral process.14 2 Even assuming that the contribution limit
only marginally infringed on speech and association rights, the
court's balancing under the guise of strict scrutiny is inconsistent
138. Id. The court stated that "while the measure at issue in Belloli completely silenced the
voice of Massachusetts corporation, the ordinance here has no such purpose or effect." Id.
139. Id. The California court adhered to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Buckley that
contribution ceilings merely require candidates and committees to raise funds from a greater number:
of sources and compel individuals who wish to exceed the contribution ceiling to expend such funds
on direct political expressio). Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 830, 614 P.2d at 749,167 Cal. Rptr. at 90-91.
142. Id. at 835-36, 614 P.2d at 751-52, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
The dissent stated as follows:
What, then, is the compelling interest requiring imposition of a restraint so
substantial on two rights so fundamental? The majority identifies it thus: "large
contributions to a local ballot measure campaign threaten our electoral system and
potentially pervert the purpose of initiative procedures; . .. [citation] My colleagues
of the majority urge a theory that public confidence in the electoral processes is
undermined by permitting unrestricted contributions in ballot measure elections. It is
noteworthy that it is not the fact of a danger but the potential of a danger that alone
generates the compelling interest found by the majority. It will readily be seen that this
wholly untested political hypothesis is not based upon any record but rather upon the
opinions and conclusions of "commentators on our political scene," "a political
scientist" or a "student of the California initiative process."
Unquestioned and unverified, however, these opinions do not constitute the hard
evidentiary support needed to demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the
suppression of the multiple First Amendment rights of our California citizens. The
existence of such a threat and its potential are wholly undocumented. Indeed the only
empirical data that appear in the record are studies of spending on statewide initiative
campaigns in California during the period 1954-1974. The studies conducted by a
Sacramento research organization, reveal that in 28 statewide contests the highest
spenders won 14 times and lost 14 times. I must leave to the reader what the arithmetic
proves.

Id. (original emphasis) (citations omitted).
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with the Supreme Court's first amendment principles. 143 In Buckley
the Court said that even though contribution limitations in
candidate campaigns represented a marginal restriction on first
amendment rights, the legislation still must be analyzed under the
strict scrutiny standard. 144 The degree of impairment is significant
only after the state has demonstrated it has a compelling interest
that is imminently threatened. Unfortunately, the California
Supreme Court seemed to ignore this first amendment standard,
which requires the government to demonstrate that the restricted
speech poses an imminent threat to the state's asserted interests. 145
The court also failed to examine whether the legislation was
46
narrowly drawn to achieve the state's goal. 1
The court found that the electoral process is "perverted"
when special interests participate through unlimited contributions. 14 7 The result is the loss of voter confidence in the
143. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S.
1013 (1978). In Morial the court held that a Louisiana law requiring a judge to resign before
running for elective office did not violate the first and fourteenth amendments. Circuit Judge
Goldberg applied the "means-end scrutiny" test:
The standard to be applied in any case is a function of the severity of impairment of
first amendment interests. As the burden comes closer to impairing core first
amendment values . . . the requisite closeness of fit of means and end increases
accordingly. The teaching of Letter Carriers, considered as part of the jurisprudence of
the first amendment . . . is that restrictions on the partisan political activity of public
employees and officers, where such activity contains substantial non-speech elements
...are constitutionally permissible ifjustified by reasonable necessity to burden those
activities to achieve a compelling public objective.
Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
Morial described a variable standard of scrutiny based upon the degree of first amendment
encroachment. The court found that the "resign to run rule" infringed upon fundamental first
amendment rights but that the impairment was not sufficiently grievous to require the strictest
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 301-02. The court then adopted "a reasonable necessity" standard and
held that the Louisiana law was reasonably necessary to promote the state's interest in avoiding the
appearance of impropriety. Id. at 302-03.
Under Morial, if the infringement on first amendment freedoms is direct but minimal, the state
need not seek the narrowest or least drastic means of achieving its end even if that end could be
achieved with no infringement at all. The Morial court was aware that the Supreme Court never
sanctioned or articulated this analysis. Id. at 300 n. 5. Unfortunately, in an effort to reconcile what
seemed to be inconsistent first amendment decisions applying strict scrutiny, the court in Morial
focused on the degree of impairment rather than on the State's crucial burden to establish and
demonstrate a threatened interest.
144. 424 U.S. at 23-28.
145. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 347; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
146. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 363;
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1962). In Letter
Carriers the Court was careful to point out that the broad restrictions imposed on civil service
employees were indeed the least drastic means to achieve the government's legitimate and threatened
goals. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 566-67
(1973).
147. 27 Cal. 3d at 827-28, 614 P.2d at 746-47, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. The court used a small
selection of articles from the wealth of academic opinions available on the subject to buttress its
contention that ballot measures are perverted when special interests participate. See infra notes 12945. The articles were used to support the proposition that the integrity of the ballot measure election
is threatened when wealthy special interests participate, because the citizenry loses confidence in the
system. Numerous other articles and academic opinions refute this logic, however. Although the
court suggested that it is harmful for "special interest" groups to utilize the ballot measure process,
the term "special interest" does not necessarily connote a malignancy in our democratic process. It
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electoral system and the creation of voter apathy. 148 In reaching
this conclusion the court glossed over the Bellotti Court's recognition
that the corruptive influence present in a candidate campaign does
not exist in a ballot measure election. 149 The majority, however,
reconciled its holding by distinguishing Bellotti. 150 The essence of
the distinction was that Berkeley's $250 contribution limit differs
from the invalidated Massachusetts statute, which prohibited
corporate spending in certain ballot measure elections.1 51 This
factual difference, however, appears constitutionally meaningless
in terms of the strict scrutiny standard. Whether a law's
prohibitory effect is total or partial is irrelevant if there is no
compelling governmental interest to justify the encroachment on
first amendment rights. The Bellotti Court did not rest its holding
on the law's prohibition of contributions, but on the fact that no
demonstrable danger to the election process was present; hence no
52
compelling governmental interest was or could be established. 1
The California court concluded that the domination of the
ballot measure process by large contributors stilled the voices of
is the voters themselves, grouped together to promote or oppose ballot measures or other issues of
public importance, who comprise the "special interests" which CARC reasoned threatened the
integrity of the electoral process. See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 130 (5th
ed. 1967). Key suggested the following:
As he speculates about the significance of pressure groups the student may well
keep in mind a warning about the popular stereotypes of these organizations ....
The
view that pressure groups are pathological growers in the body politic is likewise more
picturesque than accurate. A safer assumption is that groups developed to fill gaps in
the political system.
Id. See also Note, Corporate Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 U. MICH..J.L. REF. 781, 786
(1973). The author stated:
A pattern of association for political purposes pervades American politics. Theorists
may point to individual participation in politics as a basic element of a pluralistic
democratic society, but individual values are successfully achieved in politics by group
action. In initiative campaigns especially, interest group involvement is important to
the proper functioning of the political process. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion in United States v. CIO, one of the few cases interpreting the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act, noted, "The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has been an
integral part of our democratic electoral and legislative process. They could hardly go
on without it." Interest groups inform the electorate of how the enforcement of
particular measures would affect them, allowing voters to balance competing claims.
Id. See SHERWOOD & GABLE, THE CALIFORNIA SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 33-45 (1968); C. P. SHONER,
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT & POLITICS TODAY, 19-20 (2d ed. 1973); H. A. TURNER &J. A.4 VIEG, THE
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA, 51-64 (3d ed. 1967).
148. 27 Cal. 3d at 828-29, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
149. 435 U.S. at 790.
150. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
151. Id.
152. 435 U.S. at 788-92. The Court also seized upon Buckley dicta that a contributor's free
speech rights were only marginally impaired by a contribution limitation because the amount of the
contribution was only a rough index of support for the candidate, who remained free to speak his
own views. In so doing, the Court refused to recognize the differences between a ballot measure and
candidate contributions. Id. at 790-91.
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other contributors. 1 53 Yet the Buckley Court rejected virtually
identical rationale for limiting expenditures when it said, "[Tihe
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.... ",154 As the Court said
in Bellotti, "[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly a reason to suppress it . ",1155
Tied to this reasoning was the court's theory that large
contributions cause "voters
[to] lose confidence in our
governmental system if they come to believe that only the power of
money makes a difference." ' 156 The Supreme Court addressed

similar contentions in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo"51

(Miami HeraldPublishing) when it considered the reverse side of the
CARC coin-legislation that compelled speech in the form of a
right-of-reply statute. While not entirely on point, the case is
instructive because it shows the Court's view of governmental
attempts to protect the public from domination by powerful
interests. In Miami HeraldPublishing, Florida asserted that it had an
interest in controlling the press in order to assure public awareness
of competing points of view.158 The state claimed this statute was
necessary because, among other reasons, the press had become
noncompetitive, enormously powerful, and influential in its
capacity to manipulate popular opinion by excluding less affluent
competing points of view that were financially unable to enter into
the press establishment. 159 None of the asserted factors, standing
alone or considered together, were sufficient to convince the Court
that the first amendment restrictions were justified. The Supreme
Court stated, "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable
goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution
and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated. "160
153. 27 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
154. 424 U.S. at 48-49. See Emerson, Towarda General Theory of theFirst
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
[Tihe soundest and most rational judgment is arrived at by considering all facts and
arguments which can be put forth in behalf of or against any proposition .... Hence
an individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides of the question,
especially as presented by those who feel strongly and argue militantly for a different
view. He must consider all alternatives, test his judment by exposing it to opposition,
make full use of different minds to sift the true from the false.
Id. at 881.
155. 435 U.S. at 790.
156. 27 Cal. 3d at 827-28, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
157. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
158. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-56 (1974).
159. Id. at 249-56.
160. Id. at 256. Justice White said the following in his concurring opinion:
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The ordinance in CARC, like the Florida legislation, was
designed to avoid the influence of powerful interests. Unlike the
right-of-reply statute, however, the Berkeley contribution
limitation seemingly lacks the virtue of directly promoting this
goal. The more plausible effect of the restriction, as the Supreme
Court recognized in Bellotti, 161 will be to reduce the overall vigor of
debate to a low common denominator.
Less than one month before the CARC opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on closely analogous facts, reached a
result opposite to that of the California court. In Let's Help Florida v.
McCrary, 162 a political committee challenged a Florida statute which
limited the amount an individual could contribute to a committee
in a ballot measure campaign. The legislation provided that "[n]o
person or political committee shall make contributions to any
candidate or political committee in this state, for any election, in
excess of the following amounts: . . . (d) To any political committee
in support of, or in opposition to, an issue to be voted on in a
statewide election, $3,000.''163 Florida attempted to justify this
statute by asserting that the limitation prevented corruption and
promoted disclosure concerning the financing of election
64
campaigns. 1 .
The Fifth Circuit rejected these asserted interests and
concluded that the legislation was "ill-suited for preventing
corruption or for promoting disclosure.
",165
The court
explained that in ballot measure elections the only decision-maker
that large contributions tend to influence is the voter, which
involves the very speech activity protected by the first
amendment. 66 On this point, the court adhered to the Supreme
Court's distinction in Bellotti regarding the potential for corruption
Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be,
we prefer "the power of reason as applied through public discussion" and remain
intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow government to insinuate
itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press.
Of course, the press is not always accurate, or even responsible, and may not
present full and fair debate on important public issues. But the balance struck by the
First Amendment with respect to the press is that society must take the risk that
occasionally debate on vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints
may not be expressed ....
Any other accomodation - any other system that would
supplant private control of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion would make the government the censor of what people may read and know.
Id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).

161. 435 U.S. at 790 n. 29.
162. 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).
163. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (1) (d) (West 1977).

164. 621 F.2d at 197.
165. Id. at 201.
166. Id.
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in a candidate election as opposed to a ballot measure election. 167
Based on Bellotti, the court concluded that the statute could not be
justified on the rationale that it prevents corruption. 168 As for the
second asserted interest, the court reasoned that the limitations did
"little to promote disclosure" and unnecessarily abridged first
169
amendment associational freedoms.
170
Let's Help Floridaand CARC are factually and legally similar.
Yet, while both cases purported to apply the strict scrutiny
standard and to rely on Buckley and Bellotti for guidance, conflicting
results were reached.
VI.

MONEY AND
RESULTS

BALLOT

MEASURE

ELECTION

At the heart of the CARC opinion is the assumption that the
amount of money contributed in a ballot measure election
potentially threatens to destroy the ballot measure process and has
a direct and predictable impact upon election results. Available
literature and studies suggest, however, that methods of direct
popular legislation through ballot measure elections are thriving in
the United States. Furthermore, there is no clearly predictable
effect of money on such elections because campaign funding is only
one of many factors that influence the outcome of elections. 171
Currently, every state except Delaware permits some form of
direct legislation.1 72 The constitutional referendum is the most
widely used, and at least half of the states provide for some form of
initiative or popular referendum. 173 At least thirty-nine states
require or allow local government units to hold referenda on
167. Id. at 200.
168. Id.
169. Id. The court held that Florida can promote disclosure of the source of campaign funding
through "appropriate legislation." The appropriate legislation approved in other contexts has been
legislation requiring identification of the source of campaign funds. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 792 n. 32; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67; United States v. Harriss,
347 U.S. 612, 625-26 (1954). The court in Let's Help Florida held that prohibiting ballot measure
campaign spending did little to promote disclosure. 621 F.2d at 200.
170. If anything, Berkeley's limit is even more restrictive than Florida's: Berkeley put a $250
limit on the amount one can contribute to all committees on one side of a ballot measure (i.e., if there
were five committees, one could contribute $50 to each), while Florida's limit applies separately to
each committee even if there are more than one on a given side.
171. See generally D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1980) (unpublished dissertation); REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PRACTICE & THEORY (Butler & Ranney, eds. 1978) (hereinafter Butler & Ranney); AM. POL. SCI.
Ass'N, THE INITIATIVE PROCESS & PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING IN THE STATES: 1904-1976, address by L.
Berg (Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 1978); THE INITIATIV NEWS REP., 4-8 (Jan. 12, 1981); NEW YORK SENATE
RESEARCH SERV. TASK FORCE ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS, THE POPULAR INTEREST VERSUS THE PUBLIC

INTEREST... A REPORT ON THE POPULAR INITIATIVE, 10-14.31 (1979).
172. See generally Ranney, The United States of America, in REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF PRACTICE & THEORY 69-73, supra note 171; MAGLEBY, supra note 171, and 62.
173. Id.
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proposed local ordinances.1 74 Notwithstanding varying trends
throughout the years, the vitality of direct legislation is evidenced
by statistics regarding the total number of measures on the ballot.
Between 1898 and 1976, 2,474 proposals have appeared on ballots
in the various states that permit the use of both the initiative and
referendum, 1 " approximately 700 of which have been initiated by
1

popular petition.

76

Since 1970 the use of direct legislation has substantially
increased in the United States.177 This increase, however, cannot
be attributed to legislation designed to place limits on the amount
contributed in ballot measure campaigns as a means of averting the
purported danger of special interest money. In fact, "grass roots"
special interests have been and are successful competitors in the
direct legislation process.1 78 Moreover, the number of votes cast on
ballot measures is not significantly less than those cast for
candidates. 1 79 The continuing interest in the direct legislation
process is further evidenced by the approximately one hundred bills
currently pending in state legislatures relative to introducing and
amending the initiative and referendum processes. 80 There appear
to be no facts to sustain the CARC majority's conclusion that
contribution limits are necessary to sustain an alert and active
electorate in a ballot measure election.
The second concern in CARC was the allegation that large
contributions injected into a ballot measure campaign would
unfairly affect the outcome. However, the theory that the amount
of money spent in a campaign is the single accurate predictor of
which side will win is unfounded. The conclusions of political
174. Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at 71-73. See also Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some
Implicationsof Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 124, 125 (March 1970).
175. Butler&Ranney, supranote 171, at8l; MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 110-17.
176. Butler & Ranney, supra Note 171, at 81; MAGLEBY, supra Note 171, at 110-17.
177. THE INITIATIVE NEWS REP., supra note 171.

178. "While these high costs [of the initiative process] are identified primarily with economic
special interest groups, including not only business, but also labor unions and public employees,
Igrass roots' organizations will continue to be able to compete successfully in the initiative process
with relatively modest financial resources." Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at 118. See also Price,
The Initiative:A comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243,
260 (June 1975).
179. The drop-off rate (i e., proportion of voters who cast ballots but do not vote in a particular
candidate race or on a proposition) varies according to such factors as the type of election (i.e.,
primary, general, presidential), the type of proposition (e.g., popularly initiated proposal as opposed
to legislative proposal), ballot length, and position on the ballot. In California the overall drop-off
rate for propositions in the 1970-1978 general elections was approximately 16%; thus, on the
average, 84% of voters who cast ballots vote on state-wide.propositions. Moreover, the overall dropoff rate for initiatives in the 1970-1978 California general elections was only 7 %, a figure comparable
to the drop-off rate for several of the candidate races on those ballots. Voter fatigue (i. e., the further
down the ballot, the greater the drop-off), on the other hand, has much greater effect on candidate
elections and legislative propositions than on initiatives. See generally MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 14677.
180. NAT'L CENTER FOR INITIATIVE REVIEW, SUMMARY OF PENDING LEGISLATION RELATIVE TO
THE INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE STATES 1 (1981).
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scientists vary widely with regard to the effect of spending in
election campaigns. 18 1 These political scientists do not ignore the
presence and impact of money spent in a ballot measure election,
but most commentators acknowledge that political communication
enhanced by spending is only one of numerous factors which
coalesce in the electorate's decision-making process and thus in the
ultimate passage or defeat of a measure. 18 2 Analyzing voting
behavior is a difficult task, as it necessarily involves the
interpretation of a plethora of factors, motivations, and
predelictions.
Literature on the subject of voter behavior in ballot measure
contests almost always mentions the impact of various information
sources, including media exposure, the official voter's handbook,
and endorsements by newspapers, radio and television stations,
and public figures.18 3 Moreover, factors such as the length of a
of its
measure, the complexity of the issue, and the clarity
18 4
presentation are recognized influences on voter awareness.
Studies also indicate that the extent of voter participation is
affected by, among other things, the timing of candidate elections
and various socioeconomic factors. 1 85 Personal predispostions such
as party affiliation and personal ideology also influence the vote. 186
Finally, commentators continue to debate the significance of liberal
to cause and effect of voter
and conservative trends both as 187
contests.
measure
behavior in ballot
Money spent on ballot measures may very well influence voter
behavior. Nevertheless, historical research reveals that money
181. See generally Butler & Ranney, supra note 171; LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS-THE
ROLE OF BUSINESS IN FINANCING STATE BALLOT UVUESTION CAMPAIGNS (1979); MAGLEBY, supra note
171; MASTRO, COSTLOW & SANCHEZ, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: CORPORATE CONTROL OF THE
REFERENDUM PROCESS THROUGH MEDIA SPENDING AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (1980); SHOCKLEY,

THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN COLORADO POLITICS: AN ASSESSMENT

(1980);

TALLIAN,

DIRECT

DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM & RECALL PROCESS (1977);

Price, supra note 178; Note, The CaliforniaInitiative Process: A Sueyestionfor Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
922-41 (1975).
182. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 171; Butler & Ranney, supra note 171; LYNDENBERO, supra
Note 181, at 1, 4, 8-9; Price, supra Note 178; Hamilton, supra Note 174; 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 922-41,
supra note 181.
183. See, e.g., GREGG, NEWSPAPER ENDORSEMENTS & LOCAL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 27 (1966):
MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 248-70, 316-31; Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at 111-12; 48 S. CAL.
L. REV., supra note 181, at 938-39; Hamilton, supra note 174, at 129, 132-36; Henderson &
Rosenbaum, Prospectsfor ConsolidatingLocal Government: The Role ofElites in ElectoralOutcomes, 17 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 695 (1973).
184. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 250-51, 272-81; Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at
110-13; 48 S. CAL. L. REv., supra note 181, at 934-35.
185. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 254, 263, 268-70, 278-81; Butler & Ranney, supra
note 171, at 108-10, 114; Hamilton, supra note 174, at 126-28, 133-34; Address by H. D. Hamilton,
PoliticalEthos: The Evidence in Referenda Survey Data(Sept. 4-9, 1973).
186. See, e.g., MAGELBY, supra note 171, at 344-50; Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at 116-17;
Hamilton, supra note 174, at 126, 130.
187. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 171, at 82-83, 114, 224; The PopularInterest, supra note 171, at
34.
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alone does not dictate or explain the results of ballot
measure elections. In January 1980 the California Fair Political
Practices Commission published an official study of state elections
from 1958 through 1978, including a study of statewide ballot
measures entitled Campaign Costs.: How Much Have They Increased and
Why? The study concludes that in California, campaign spending
for state-wide ballot measures has remained fairly constant during
the last twenty-five years. 188
Analysis of official spending statistics gathered by the Fair
Political Practices Commission and earlier spending reports and
election results obtained from the California Secretary of State's
office, reveals that the higher spender prevails fifty-four percent of
the time. (Appendix 1). Results tabulated up to the 1974 general
election reveal that the split was equal at that time, with the high
and low spenders each winning fifty percent of the time. (Appendix
1). 189 Further, there appears to be no correlation between the
spending differential of the opposing sides and the success or failure
of the higher spender (i.e., the higher spender cannot ensure
success even by substantially outspending an opponent).
(Appendix 2).
From 1912 to 1979, 165 initiative measures qualified for the
ballot in California. One hundred eighteen, or seventy percent of
these, were rejected by the voters. 190 In major ballot measure
elections since 1954, just over sixty-eight percent failed. (Appendix
1). Of these, the high spender was the opponent fifty percent of the
time. Tabulating elections in which one side outspent the other by
188.

CALIFORNIA

FAIR

POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM'N,

CAMPAIGN

COSTS:

How MUCH HAVE

& WHY? 8 (1980). The Commission's report rants selected state-wide ballot
measures from 1956-1978 in terms of actual or "current" dollars spent. This table is reproduced as
Appendix 1.A comparison ranking then considers these same ballot measures but ranks according to
constant dollars spent. (Appendix 2). The constant dollar is determined by using 1958 as the year in
which a dollar is assumed to be worth a dollar, then adjusting campaign costs in all other years
according to consumer price indices.
This comparison produces a rather startling rebuttal to the arguments of those wishing to cap
purportedly spiraling campaign costs with spending limitations. Appendix I shows that the
Proposition 5 campaign for the 1978 general election ballot to regulate smoking was the most
expensive in terms of current dollars spent. It ranks only fourth, however, in terms of constant
dollars. Proposition 4 for ,il and Gas Conservation on the 1956 general election remains the most
expensive California campaign in the last 20 years in terms of constant dollars. The Commission's
study concludes as follows: "These findings do not support a conclusion that costs for statewide
ballot measures are increasing significantly."
189. See Appendices 1, 2 and 3 (compiled from CALIFORNIA FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM'N,
THEY

INCREASED

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION & SPENDING REPORT, JUNE 8, 1976 PRIMARY ELECTION; Nov. 2, 1976
GENERAL ELECTION; JUNE 6, 1978 PRIMARY ELECTION; Nov. 7, 1978 GENERAL ELECTION; JUNE 3,
1980 PRIMARY ELECTION; CALIFORNIA RESEARCH, SURVEY OF SPENDING IN STATEWIDE INITIATIVE

CAMPAIGNS 1954-1974 cited in Petitioner's Brief, Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. FPPC, 16 Cal. 3d
671, 547 P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr, 106 (1976)); MARCH FONG Eu, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS 10-12 (Oct. 1979).
190. MARCH FONG Eu, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA
INITIATIVE PROCESS 10-12 (Oct. 1979).
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at least a two to one margin (Appendix 3), the failure rate remains
between sixty percent and eighty percent whether the money was
spent to pass or defeat the measure. This correlates with the general
overall failure rate of ballot measures. The failure rate for
initiatives is approximately seventy percent; for ballot measures as
a whole, the failure rate is between fifty and sixty percent.
Rent control measures in the City of Berkeley present an
interesting case. Rent control has been proposed by initiative four
times: in 1972; in 1977 (the election giving rise to the CARC case);
in 1978; and in 1980. In at least three of the contests, the rent
control opponents significantly outspent the measure's proponents.
Nevertheless, the measures were passed into law three out of four
times. (Appendix 4).
Thus, there appears to be no substantive evidence to show that
the spectre of large contributions has dimmed the popularity of
direct legislation, or that voter interest and confidence has waned.
Moreover, legislation that imposes limits on contributions will not
resolve the problem of dominant voter influence. The amount of
money spent in an election is only one of numerous factors to
consider in evaluating the outcome.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ballot measure elections exemplify the ideal of the democratic
process and perhaps the embodiment of its most pristine form-self
government by direct popular legislation. 191 The objective of
governmental neutrality in the electoral process has been
reaffirmed repeatedly by the courts.192 The exercise of
governmental restraint in this process is a goal sought when first
amendment speech is unduly abridged. Such regulations should be
promulgated only in the most compelling circumstances. Courts
must continue to scrutinize stringently government attempts to
limit free political debate of important public issues. Our system of
democracy is based upon a respect for the intelligence and common
sense of the citizenry. Legislation regulating campaign
contributions to ballot measure committees, well intentioned as it
may be, reflects a basic departure from this principle and
substitutes government's judgments for those of the public.
191. See Butler & Ranney, supra note 171, at 93-99.
192. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947); Anderson v. City of Boston, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1978). See also Polsby, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 1; A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 76-81 (1972).
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APPENDIX 1V

Spending
Prop.

Description

Results

1954 GENERAL ELECTION
Failed
4
Aid to needy aged

1956 GENERAL ELECTION
Failed
Oil and gas
4
conservation
1958 GENERAL ELECTION
Failed
16 Abolishing tax
exemption for
religious school property
Failed
18 "Right to work"
1960 GENERAL ELECTION
15 Reapportion Senate Failed
1962 GENERAL ELECTION
Passed
22 Osteopath
Failed
23 Initiative Reapportion Senate
Failed
24 Declaring
subversive
1964 GENERAL ELECTION
Passed
14 Repeal "Rumford
Act"

a.

Against

218,032 62

Won

$1,428,056

41

Lost

$1,340,817

37

Won

2,316,200 39

Won

72

Won

$ 134,928

$

$3,450,211

$ 499,188

892,862

$ 241,852

$ 334,468

$ 275,525

$

136,888

Lo/Hi High
%b. Spender

66,839 24

Won

243,975 56

Won

104,074

12,985

12

Lost

$ 660,940

$1,174,056

56

Lost

This spending survey considers only ballot measure campaigns in which
there were expenditures in excess of $1,000.00 by each side. When the
spending threshold for both sides is increased, the percent win-loss record for
the high spender changes, but no pattern emerges that would suggest that as
the issue is more "hotly" contested in monetary terms, the higher spender
will prevail:

Each side spent:
$100,000.00
>.$ 500,000.00
>$1,000,000.00

b.

For

Higher
% Win
64
53
67

Spender
% Loss
36
47
33

This percentage represents the ratio of the amount spent by the low spender
to the amount spent by the high spender.
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15

Prohibiting Pay
TV

16

Statewide Lottery

17

Eliminate
"featherbedding"
on railroad
train crews

878,506

198,191

23

Won

Failed

549,884

46,245

8

Lost

Passed

1,934,786

925,827 48

Won

Passed

1968 GENERAL ELECTION
9
Limiting ad
valorem
Fail ed
tax

$ 230,908

$1,024,392

23

Won

$1,082,175

$ 325,212 30

Lost

1972 PRIMARY ELECTION
9
Environment
Failed

$ 228,233

$1,381,199

17

Won

1972 GENERAL ELECTION
Limiting taxes
Failed

$1,277,803

1970 PRIMARY ELECTION
8
Reducing property
Failed
tax

$ 776,487 61

Lost

Establish state
employee salaries
at prevailing rates

Failed

1,781,687

22,537

Lost

Death penalty
Obscenity initiative
Legalizing
marijuana

Passed
Failed

60,068
877,256

Failed

44,224
162,899
191,619

Coastal initiative

Passed

294,786

1,156,583

Lost

Prohibit busing
Agricultural labor

Passed

42,683

12,917

Won

Failed

956,137

229,281

Lost

1973 SPECIAL ELECTION
I
Tax limitation
Failed

$2,018,527

$ 926,681 46

Lost

1974 PRIMARY ELECTION
9
Political reform
Passed

$ 608,658

$ 201,879 33

Won

$ 447,497

$ 247,258 55

Lost

$

$

Lost

1974 GENERAL ELECTION
17 Wild and scenic
Failed
rivers
1976 PRIMARY
5
Banks, Corporations, Franchises
& Insurers
Taxation

Passed

22,733

1

4,995

24,409 93

Lost
Won
Lost

422

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

6

Insurance
Company Home
Office Tax
Deduction

Passed

12,605

237,747

5

Lost

8

Deposit of Public
Monies in Savings
& Loan
Associations
Nuclear Power
Plants

Passed

198,878

4,210

3

Won

Failed

1,257,132

4,033,590 31

Won

1976 GENERAL ELECTION
Failed
5
Interest Rates
Allowable

$ 661,767

15

$

48,051

17

Lost

Failed

652,677

1,315,557

50

Won

Failed

1,358,437

1,898,649

72

Won

1978 PRIMARY ELECTION
13 Tax limitationC.
Passed

$2,158,560

$2,096,723

98

Won

$ 700,606

$6,411,318

11

Won

13
14

Greyhound Dog
Racing
Agriculture Labor
Relations

1978 GENERAL ELECTION
Failed
5
Regulation of
Smoking
6

School EmployeesHomosexuality

Failed

1,033,722

1,279,811

81

Won

7

Murder-Penalty

Passed

657,885

12,352

2

Won

26,397 28

Lost
Lost

1980 PRIMARY ELECTION
Failed
1
Parklands Bond
Act
9

10
11

$

90,976

$

Taxation
(Income tax)

Failed

3,633,565

1,777,740 49

Rent control
Taxation-Surtax

Failed
Failed

6,655,212
455,899

178,271
5,611,457
WON
LOST

c.

Includes spending in the Proposition
Dwellings - Tax Rate.

8 campaign,

3
8

Lost
Won
22
19

(54%)
(46%)

Owner-Occupied

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITS

VOTE TOTALS
PROPOSITION
1954 General
#4
1956 General
#4
1958 General
#16
#18

YES

NO

1,688,319(45.4%)

2,030,132 (54.6%)

1,208,752(23.4%)

3,950,532 (76.6%)

1,686,122(32.8%)
2,079,975 (40.4%)

3,446,829 (67.2 %)
3,070,837 (59.6%)

1960 General
#15
1962 General
#22
#23
#24

1,876,185 (35.5 %)

3,408,090 (64.5%)

3,407,957 (68.9%)
2,181,758(46.6%)
1,978,520 (40.3%)

1,536,470 (31.1%)
2,495,404 (53.4%)
2,928,350 (59.7 %)

1964 General
#14
#15
#16
#17

4,526,460 (65.4%)
4,515,013 (66.4%)
2,063,617 (30.9%)
4,074,648 (61.0%)

2,395,747 (34.6%)
2,286,775 (33.6%)
4,606,070 (69.1%)
2,602,731 (39.0%)

1968 General
#9

2,146,010 (32.0%)

4,570,097 (68.0%)

1970 Primary
#8
1972 Primary
#9

1,321,092 (28.5%)

3,316,919(71.5%)

2,128,087 (35.3%)

3,901,151 (64.7%)

1972 General
#14
#15
#17
#18
#19
#20
#21
#22

2,700,095 (34.1%)
2,539,611 (32.5%)
5,447,165 (67.5%)
2,603,927 (32.1%)
2,733,120 (33.5%)
4,363,375 (55.2%)
4,962,420 (63.1%)
3,348,179 (42.1%)

5,213,485 (65.9%)
5,271,067 (67.5%)
2,617,514(32.5%)
5,503,888 (67.9%)
5,433,393 (66.5%)
3,548,180(44.8%)
2,907,776 (36.9%)
4,612,642 (57.9%)

1,961,685 (46.0%)

2,303,026 (54.0%)

3,224,765 (69.8%)

1,392,783 (30.2 %)

2,615,235 (47.1%)

2,935,365 (52.9%)

3,204,294 (59.4%)
3,645,372 (67.0 %)
3,978,512 (74.2%)
1,950,430 (32.5%)

2,188,419(40.6%)
1,795,486 (33.0%)
1,383,010 (25.8%)
4,648,355 (67.5%)

1973 Special
#1
1974 Primary
#9
1974 General
#17
1976 Primary
#5
#6
#8
#15

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
1978 Primary
#13
1978 General
#5
#6
#7
1980 Primary
#1
#9
#10
#11

4,280,689 (64.8 %)

2,326,167 (35.2%)

3,125,148 (45.6%)
2,823,293 (41.6%)
4,480,275 (71.1%)

3,721,682(54.4%)
3,969,120(58.4%)
1,818,357(28.9%)

2,800,038
2,538,667
2,247,395
2,821,150

(47.0 %)
(39.2%)
(35.4%)
(44.3%)

3,163,823
3,942,248
4,090,180
3,544,840

(53.0%)
(60.8%)
(64.6%)
(55.7 %)

APPENDIX 2

LO/HI %
0-10%
10-20%
20-30%
0-30%
30-40%
40-50 %
0-50%
50-60%*
60-70%
70-80%
80-90%
90-100%

HIGH SPENDER WON
3outof 8times = 37%
3outof 4 times = 75%
4outof 9times = 44%
10 out of21 times = 48%
4outof 4 times = 100%
2outof 5 times = 40%
16 out of30 times = 53%
1 outof 3 times = 33%
1 outof 2 times = 50%
2outof 3 times = 67%
2outof 2 times = 100%
1 out of 2 times = 50%

*Example: When the low spender spent 50-60% of what the high spender spent,
the high spender won in 1 out of 3 elections.
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APPENDIX 4

BERKELEY RENT CONTROL BALLOT MEASURES a
Proponents Opponents
Measure
(Spending reports
1972 Measure I,
not available)
Rent Control Board:
1977 Measure B,
Rent Control:
Contributions over $250.00:
1978 Measure I,
Rent Tax Relief:
Contributions over $250.00:
1980 Measure D,
Rent Stabilization:

$ 5,500.00
-0-

Failed

8
"

$ 7 , 0 0 0 .00 b
-0-

$ 81,000.00

Passed

50

$23,500.00"

Contributions over $250.00:

$136,000.00

Results
Passed

1

$ 80,000.00

Passed

63

a. Statistics available in elections results and spending reports in the City Clerk's
Office, City of Berkeley, California.
b. Includes spending in support of candidates.

